The applicable law in the Caribbean Single Market by Nelson, Rolston
The conundrum of the regional court is that while itis a supranational body created by internationalagreements and applying international law, it pur-
ports to prescribe a uniform local law for the limited geo-
graphic area of its jurisdiction based on considerations
legal and economic peculiar to that geographic area.
Regional courts set up under regional trade agreements
aim to affect the internal trade laws of a group of states by
making them uniform and consistent throughout the
region. Thus, regional courts will develop a legal régime
peculiar to those states that can hardly be said to be of
universal application to all states as international law.
Regional courts of justice exist as offshoots of regional
economic communities. But not all regional economic
communities have a court of justice. The North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have none. But the
European Union, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),
the Andean Community and the Central American
Integration System have courts of justice. Since several
regional courts of justice are all modelled on the European
Court of Justice, it is convenient to compare the Caribbean
Court of Justice and the European Court of Justice to
discover what law applies to regional courts of justice.
BACKGROUND TO CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION
The CARICOM Single Market and Economy (“CSME”)
was established by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (“the
Revised Treaty”), which the Caribbean Court of Justice
(hereinafter referred to as “the Caribbean Court”) is
required by Article 211 of the Revised Treaty to interpret
and apply. The Caribbean Court is not a national court,
and it is not an institution of the Caribbean Community.
The original Treaty of Chaguaramas (“the original
Treaty”) established the Caribbean Community and a
Common Market. It was signed at Chaguaramas, Trinidad
on July 4, 1973. On July 5, 2001 in Nassau, Bahamas the
original Treaty was amended by nine protocols. I refer to
the amended Treaty as the Revised Treaty. The purpose of
the Revised Treaty, as set out in an extensive 28 paragraph
preamble, is to create one single internal market among
the Member States and to forge a new Caribbean economy
by pooling the natural resources of the region. The aim
and purpose of economic integration is a new Caribbean
economy based on exports that are internationally
competitive, a pooling of resources and functional co-
operation generally. Monetary union is envisaged as well
convergence of macro-economic performance and policies
through harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policies.
On February 14, 2001 in Barbados some Member
States signed the Agreement establishing the Caribbean
Court (“the Agreement”), giving the court an original juris-
diction to interpret and apply the Revised Treaty. The con-
tracting parties to the Agreement recognise the jurisdiction
of the court as compulsory, ipso facto and without special
agreement: see Article XVI of the Agreement, which has an
almost verbatim counterpart in Article 216 of the Revised
Treaty.
THE REVISED TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW
There is no doubt that the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) like the European Union, is a creature of
international law. International law principally consists of:
(a) customary international law, ie legally binding rules
that have developed between states over time and
(b) the law of treaties, which deals with the principles
affecting the making of international agreements.
Article XVI of the Agreement and Article 216 of the
Revised Treaty constitute an acceptance or consent ante hoc
to the jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court on the
international plane. These provisions are similar to the
optional clause in Article 36(2) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. No other international
tribunal than the Caribbean Court may be called upon to
adjudicate a dispute between Member States or between
Member States and the Community or between a
CARICOM individual and either a Member State or the
Community. However, the introduction of the word
“exclusive” in Article 211 (jurisdiction of the Caribbean
Court in contentious proceedings) has created the
impression that on the municipal plane national courts
have no jurisdiction to entertain questions concerning the
interpretation and application of the Revised Treaty.
“Exclusive” in Article 211 emphasises the mandatory
nature of the Caribbean Court’s jurisdiction on the
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international plane. Indeed Article 214 of the Revised
Treaty (referral to the Caribbean Court) envisages that
decisions on issues of fact in relation to the reference
remain squarely in the hands of the national court. Article
177 of the EC Treaty, which contained a similar provision
for references by a national court to the ECJ has been given
a similar interpretation: see Practice Direction – References to
the European Court. Thus, there exists side by side with the
Caribbean Court’s jurisdiction on the international plane a
parallel but restricted jurisdiction at the municipal level.
Regional trade agreements, though born out of
agreements in international law, are normative and thus
create regional or Community law that is different from
international law. I refer to two ways in which Community
law is different from international law. In the first place,
regional economic communities can confer rights and
impose obligations on Community nationals, although that
is not normally the case in international law. Secondly, in
international law a breach of treaty obligations is normally
a matter between the contracting states, and enforcement
of such obligations is hardly ever by individuals or entities
against a contracting state or their own state and rarely
before an international court with compulsory jurisdiction
or before a national court. Thus, I accept that regional
integration treaties create a new legal system, but recognize
that the new system is derivative of international law.
Within the Community, a new international legal order of
international law is created, but outside the Community
international law prevails, as for example, as regards the
Community’s relations with third parties: see case 10/61
Italy v Commission [1962] ECR 1, 10.
EVOLUTION TO A NEW COMMUNITY
LEGAL SYSTEM
International regional trade agreements are at the outset
governed by international law, and, as stated above,
particularly by customary international law relating to
treaties. It is generally accepted that the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (“the Vienna
Convention”) codifies that customary law. Thus, the
interpretation of a regional trade agreement is governed by
Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention.
According to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, a
treaty has to be interpreted in its context and in the light
of the object and purpose of the treaty. By Article 31(2)
the context includes the text of the treaty including its
preamble and annexes.
In construing the Revised Treaty one has to bear in mind
that the revision took place in the context of “the
commitment to deepening regional economic integration
through the establishment of the CARICOM Single Market
and Economy”: see the first paragraph of the Preamble.
In addition to the clearly articulated objective of
economic integration, the Revised Treaty envisages a role
for Community nationals in the integration movement.
Article 222 of the Revised Treaty (locus standi of private
entities) provides for private party litigation against a
Member State or the Community with respect to rights or
benefits conferred on Community nationals.
Further, Article 214 makes it mandatory for a national
court or tribunal to refer a question concerning the
interpretation or application of the Revised Treaty to the
Caribbean Court, if the resolution of that question is
necessary “to enable it to deliver judgment.” The parties
before the national court may include private entities or
individuals against a Member State or Member States
against one another.
In the well-known ECJ case of NV Algemene Transport-en
Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse
Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 (“Van Gend en
Loos”) the ECJ noted the stated objective of economic
integration in the EEC Treaty and the indications in the
preliminary procedure that nationals were to be involved
and participate in the integration process. These
considerations led the Caribbean Court to the conclusion
that the EEC Treaty, which had been created by
international law, was more than just a pact between states,
but was an agreement from which individuals and private
entities could derive rights. That was the foundation of the
conclusion of the ECJ in Van Gend en Loos that “the
Community constitutes a new legal order of international
law for the benefit of which the states have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields and the
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but
also their nationals.” The phrase “a new legal order of
international law” was modified in Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL
[1964] ECR 585, to “its own legal system”. Later in Case
294/83 Parti écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v European Parliament [1986]
ECR 1339 the EEC Treaty is described as “the basic
constitutional charter.” In an opinion on the draft
agreement creating the European Economic Area, Opinion
1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, para 1 the Caribbean Court
described the ECJ Treaty in these terms:
“…. The EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an
international agreement, nonetheless constitutes the
constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law.
As the Court of Justice has consistently held, the Community
treaties established a new legal order for the benefit of which
the States have limited their sovereign rights …”
Similarly in relation to the Revised Treaty, the Caribbean
Court of Justice has held that evolving from the
international agreement of the Revised Treaty was a new
regional legal order based on the rule of law. In TCL v
Caribbean Community [2009] 2 CCJ 2 (OJ) the court said this:
“By signing and ratifying the Revised Treaty and thereby
conferring on this Court ipso facto a compulsory and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the
interpretation and application of the Revised Treaty, the
Member States transformed the erstwhile voluntary
arrangements in CARICOM into a rule-based system, thus 3
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creating and accepting a regional system under the rule of
law. A challenge by a private party to decisions of the
Community is therefore not only not precluded, but is a
manifestation of such a system… The rule of law brings with
it legal certainty and protection of rights of states and
individuals alike, but at the same time of necessity it creates
legal accountability.”
The new Community legal system comprises the
prescriptive rules laid down by the Revised Treaty and the
legal rules which the Caribbean Court pronounces in its
rulings and judgments. Thus, international law has
facilitated the consensual agreement of states to create a
new legal system and to displace customary international
law in the areas covered by the Revised Treaty. In so far as
the Revised Treaty is silent or the language is vague, the
judges must speak and clarify. In Bulmer Ltd v Bollinger SA
[1974] 1 Ch 401, 425 Lord Denning MR described the
EEC Treaty in language which is appropriate to the Revised
Treaty: “All the way through the Treaty there are gaps and
lacunae. These have to be filled in by the judges …“ In
filling those gaps or lacunae, the court will have to apply
“such rules of international law as may be applicable” in
accordance with Article 217 of the Revised Treaty. Among
such rules of international law will be “the general
principles of law” derived from a comparative study of all
or most of the legal systems of the Member States.
Notwithstanding the fact that both under the Revised
Treaty and the EEC Treaty, there emerged a separate legal
system of Community law, there are important differences
between the European and Caribbean treaties. In the
Caribbean Community legal system, no community
organisation has power to issue subsidiary legislation.
There are no regulations or directives to bind Member
States directly, ie in their national legal systems. There
must be the intervention of the constitutional procedures
of Member States in order for decisions of organs and
bodies of Community organisations to create rights and
obligations for nationals of Member States, as Article 240
expressly provides. Further, there is no central body,
similar to the European Commission, with power to
impose and enforce economic integration by direct
legislation or by orders for the harmonisation of laws and
procedures, or to impose sanctions in the event of non-
compliance with Community law.
It is to be noted that the Caribbean Court stresses the
effect of the regional treaty provisions among sovereign
states was to create a régime which required compliance by
states with the obligations created in the treaty. Lord
Bingham of Cornhill made the same point in his lecture on
“The Rule of Law” delivered at the Centre for Public Law
of the University of Cambridge on November 16, 2006:
“ … the existing principle of the rule of law requires
compliance by the state with its obligations in international
law, the law which whether deriving from treaty or international
custom and practice governs the conduct of nations.”
THE COMMUNITY LEGAL SYSTEM ABND
THE NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
In the context of the Caribbean Community, the treaty
provisions may confer rights and obligations on individuals and
entities within a Member State and within the sphere of
application of Community law. Those Community rights and
obligations are not only theoretically part of the law of the land
but have actually been adopted as part of the law of the land.
Individuals and entities may therefore invoke those rights and
obligations before the courts subject to the principle that the
final authority on the interpretation and application of
Community law is the Caribbean Court of Justice.
If the Caribbean Community legal system is a separate
legal system from the international legal system created by
the Revised Treaty, an issue also arises as to the relationship
between the Community legal system and the national legal
system. Essentially, the question is whether provisions of
the Revised Treaty have legal effect within the domestic
legal system of Member States. I here refer to their legal
effect before the national courts.
There are two legal traditions within the Caribbean
Community: the civil law system and the common law
system. Broadly speaking, one might describe the civil law
tradition as “monist” in the sense that international law
and domestic law are one system, and the common law
tradition as “dualist” in the sense that international law
and domestic law are separate systems. In the dualist
system, international law has to be incorporated
domestically before it has any domestic effect: see Attorney-
General v Joseph and Boyce (2006) 69 WIR 104 at [55] and R
v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind
[1991] AC 696; Asfaw v R [2008] 1 AC 1061 at [29].
However, the distinction between the monist and dualist
approaches to the relationship between international law
and domestic law requires careful analysis. Under both the
monist and the dualist approaches the basic rule is that the
application of treaties in domestic law is governed by a rule
of domestic law. But those rules of domestic law vary and
are not cut and dried.
In countries such as Belgium, France, the Netherlands
and the United States a treaty which has been approved by
the state and which has entered into force on the
international plane automatically becomes part of the law
of the state without any separate act of “incorporation” or
“transformation” being required.
In states such as Germany and Italy (commonly regarded
as “dualist” states) a treaty must have parliamentary
approval. Once parliamentary approval is granted the
treaty automatically becomes part of the law of the land.
Nonetheless, in Belgium commercial treaties and those
which might affect the state or become binding on certain
Belgians must have parliamentary approval before they
have legal effect in Belgium: see Article 68(2) of the
Belgian Constitution.4
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In France, the constitution provides that certain
categories of treaties may only be ratified or approved by
way of legislation. In the Netherlands, Article 91(1) of the
constitution provides that “The Kingdom shall not be
bound by treaties … without the prior approval of the
States – General.” It also provides that the cases in which
approval is not required shall be specified by statute.
The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that the
manner in which a treaty may be given effect to in
domestic law may differ according to the specific
requirements of domestic law. Indeed, even in the United
Kingdom it would not be entirely correct to say that an
unincorporated treaty has no effect in domestic law. The
courts have recourse to unincorporated treaties. Such
treaties may be considered where the legislation is
ambiguous, in which case courts will construe a legal
provision in a manner that is consistent with the
international obligations of the state.
I conclude therefore that merely to label the common
law Member States as dualist and Suriname and Haiti as
monist does not assist substantially in discovering whether
treaty provisions have a direct effect in domestic law in the
Caribbean Community, or in regional courts generally.
In the Caribbean Community, the problem of whether
treaty provisions conferring rights on individuals and
entities have passed into domestic law does not turn on the
distinction between monism and dualism since
parliamentary approval for the Revised Treaty has been
obtained in all the Member States except the Bahamas and
Montserrat, the latter not being members of the single
market. By contrast in the European Community under
the EEC Treaty and the EC Treaty the direct effect of Treaty
provisions and subsidiary legislation was automatic
regardless of their legal position on incorporation of
treaties into the national legal order. This was one of the
novel features of Van Gend en Loos. The prohibition against
new or increased duties on imports or exports or charges
with equivalent effect was “a clear and unconditional
prohibition” which did not contemplate “any legislative
intervention on the part of the states.”
In relation to the common law countries in the
Caribbean, the method of incorporation has been to
pass an Act of Parliament with the Revised Treaty
scheduled thereto and for the Act to state that the
Revised Treaty shall have the force of law. A treaty so
incorporated becomes part of the law of the land. Thus,
in several territories, common law as well as civil law
Member States have made the Revised Treaty part of
their law. The consequence of the Revised Treaty
becoming national law must be that disputes arising out
the Revised Treaty are cognizable before the national
courts. However, Article 211 of the Revised Treaty
accords “compulsory and exclusive” jurisdiction in such
matters to the Caribbean Court on the international
plane. As indicated above the word “exclusive” refers to
adjudication on the international plane. A national
court has jurisdiction over an issue of the application
and interpretation subject to the limits set out in Article
214 of the Revised Treaty (referral to the Caribbean
Court)
REFERENCE TO THE CARIBBEAN COURT
AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
Article 214 mandates a national court or tribunal to
refer a question as to the interpretation or application of
the Revised Treaty to the Caribbean Court if the resolution
of that question is “necessary to enable it to deliver
judgment.” The EEC Treaty contains a similar provision in
Article 177, later Article 234 of the EC Treaty.
Article 214 allows the national court the discretion to
decide when a reference is necessary. Nonetheless, there
may be good reasons why no ruling may be necessary. One
such reason may be that the Caribbean Court has already
decided the point. In Cases 26-30/62 Da Costa v
Nederlandse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 31 the
European Court of Justice did not entertain a preliminary
reference since the point at issue had already been
determined in Van Gend en Loos (supra). Similarly, previous
decisions of the Caribbean Court may have dealt with the
point of law, though the questions at issue were not
identical.
Another doctrine of the European Court of Justice that
ought to be useful is the acte clair principle, whereby if a
national court considers the answer to the problem is so
clear, it may refuse to make a reference: see CILFIT v
Ministry of Health (supra) where the ECJ said:
“16. Finally the correct application of Community law may
be so obvious as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the
manner in which the question raised is to be resolved.”
The principles to be derived from the cases above cited
suggest the national courts should become an integral part
of Community law. Where there is Community precedent
national courts might deal with the matter. Equally, where
the doctrine of acte clair applied the national courts may not
refer a matter. In all other cases, the national courts may
refer an issue of treaty interpretation or application to the
Caribbean Court. The effect of the use of the reference
procedure in Article 214 of the Revised Treaty in this way
would be (1) to build a system of precedent in which the
rulings of the court are binding; (2) to involve individuals
and entities in the national courts in Community law.
The allocation of a greater role to national courts in
Community law is not to ignore the fact that under the
reference procedure in Article 214 and in all matters of
Community law, the Caribbean Court of Justice is the final
authoritative voice. Where the national courts are wrong
or are doubtful, the Caribbean court will pronounce finally.
The court’s role is to promote uniformity and consistency
in decisions across the Caribbean Community. 5
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COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW –
THE ISSUE OF PRIMACY
The experience of the most established regional court,
the European Court of Justice, suggests that there are two
main pillars of the Community legal system: the doctrine of
direct effect earlier discussed and the doctrine of
supremacy of Community law.
In areas within the competence of the Caribbean Court
of Justice, Community law must prevail over national law.
A former judge of the European Court of Justice, Pierre
Pescatore, put the matter thus:
“Community law holds within itself an existential necessity for
supremacy. If it is not capable in all circumstances of taking
precedence over national law, it is ineffective and, to that
extent non-existent.”
Although the proposition advanced by Judge Pescatore
seems compelling in that it is a necessary concomitant of
uniform application of Community law, it conceals serious
difficulties for the common law countries of the Caribbean
Community. Chief among them are inconsistencies
between Community law and earlier or later national
legislation and between Community law and constitutional
provisions. For example, it is common in Caribbean
constitutions to find a supreme law clause which nullifies
all other laws to the extent of the inconsistency with the
constitution. Could a Revised Treaty provision or a
Community act be challenged on the ground that it is
unconstitutional? Would a Member State be able to deny
social and economic rights deriving from the Revised
Treaty, such as the right without discrimination to
healthcare, school places for children or scholarships (now
reserved only to nationals) on the ground that such rights
are not recognized by the constitution?
In Costa v ENEL (supra) the European Court of Justice ruled
that the supremacy of Community law was a general principle
that could not be overridden by domestic legal provisions.
Costa was a shareholder in Edison Volta, one of the
companies affected by the nationalisation of the production
and distribution of electricity. The Italian Government
transferred the assets of the nationalised companies to a
state-owned company, ENEL. Costa contended that the
nationalisation law contravened several EEC Treaty
provisions: Article 93 (state aids), Article 102 (distortion of
competition), Article 37 (state undertakings) among others.
Costa had received an electricity bill from ENEL and went to
the Giudice Conciliatore, who referred the matter in two
directions – (1) to the Italian Constitutional Court and (2) to
the European Court of Justice.
At the time the EEC Treaty had been ratified in Italy by
an ordinary law, which could not derogate from the
constitution. The Italian court held that the later
nationalisation law, to the extent it was inconsistent with
the law ratifying the Treaty of Rome, would repeal the
earlier law.
The European Court of Justice on the other hand held
that the Treaty of Rome (“the EEC Treaty”) took
precedence over the nationalisation law. Community law
had to prevail for the following reasons: (1) the special and
original nature of Community law as an independent
source of law; (2) acceptance of the new legal system by the
Member States on a basis of reciprocity; (3) the transfer of
rights and obligations to the Community resulting in a
permanent limitation of their sovereignty; (4) a unilateral
repudiation of the Treaty was incompatible with the
concept of Community and must be rejected.
In Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1972) 11
CMLR 255 the claimant argued that a Community
regulation was contrary to the principles of freedom of
disposition, economic liberty and proportionality
guaranteed by the German Constitution. It was contended
that the regulation was in breach of the constitution and
invalid. The ECJ held that the law deriving from the Treaty
could not because of its very nature be overridden by rules
of national law. The validity of a community measure could
not be affected by allegations that it ran counter to either
fundamental rights in the constitution or the principles
underlying a constitutional structure.
The European Court of Justice held that a Member State
had a duty to give precedence to Community law over
earlier or later national legislation and to refuse to apply
the offending national legislation even in the absence of an
application to set it aside.
In Case 213/89 Factortame [1990] ECR I – 2433 on a
reference from the House of Lords the ECJ expanded the
principle in Simmenthal (supra) by requiring national courts
in a case before them concerning Community law to set
aside any rule of national law that precluded them from
granting interim relief. The House of Lords [1990] 2
Lloyd’s Rep. 365 (H.L.) later granted an interim injunction
pending final judgment restraining the Secretary of State
from withholding or withdrawing registration of specified
shipping vessels pursuant to certain challenged statutory
regulations.
Independently of Costa v ENEL (supra), in monist
countries, Community law when it conflicts with national
law may take precedence over national law. For example,
in the Netherlands, which gave Suriname its system of law,
provisions in international treaties which bind the state and
citizens have direct effect and take precedence over
national legislation and even the constitution: see Articles
93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution. Articles 105 and
106 of the Suriname Constitution are in similar vein.
“Article 105 – The provisions of the agreement mentioned in
article 103 which may be directly applicable to anyone shall
have this binding effect as from the time of publication.
Article 106 – Legal regulations in force in the Republic of
Suriname shall not apply, if this application should be
incompatible with provisions that are directly applicable to6
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anyone, to agreements entered into either before or after the
enactment of the regulations. “
Article 55 of the French Constitution states that treaties
and agreements duly ratified “have authority superior to
that of laws.”
The 1987 Haiti Constitution contains a similar clause in
Article 276-2, which provides:
“Once international treaties or agreements are approved and
ratified in the manner stipulated by the Constitution, they
become part of the legislation of the country and abrogate any
laws in conflict with them.”
Thus, in the case of the four monist states of the EEC,
as in the case of Haiti and Suriname in the Caribbean
Community, Community law is and was supreme over
national law. By contrast, at the time of Costa v ENEL
(supra), in the case of dualist states such as Germany and
Italy, international treaties did not enjoy a higher status
than national law. An international treaty when transposed
into domestic law became like any other law, vulnerable to
implied repeal by a later statute.
The effect of this difference of approach between the
monist and dualist countries of the EEC Treaty would have
been to produce different results in respect of later
incompatible legislation. It was in order to ensure that
there would be even consistent and uniform application of
Community law in the six countries of the EEC that the
doctrine of supremacy of Community law was
propounded.
In the Caribbean Community in the light of a similar
cleavage between monist and dualist Member States and
the importance of maintaining uniform and consistent
interpretation of the Revised Treaty, the need arises for a
doctrine of supremacy in the limited area where
Community law and national law overlap. However, there
are two major obstacles to the application of the doctrine
of supremacy in the Caribbean Community law:
(1) the supreme law clauses of the “common law”
constitutions and
(2) the Protocol to the Revised Treaty of 2005 (“the 2005
Protocol”)
The 2005 Protocol provides:
Article I
Relationship to Constitutional Order
Insert in the Revised Treaty Article 222 (bis) as follows:
The provisions regarding the original jurisdiction
set out in this Chapter shall not be construed to
require a Contracting Party to enact legislation that
is inconsistent with its constitutional structure or
the nature of its legal systems.
This article seems designed to encourage signature,
ratification and local incorporation of the Revised Treaty by
states. On the other hand, the language of the 2005
Protocol might be construed as a rule of construction for
municipal judges that no transposed provision of the
Revised Treaty is to be treated as unconstitutional.
However, it is unlikely that any municipal court would
make an order that the state amend the constitution. At
best it would make a declaration of incompatibility with
the constitution.
Further, the 2005 Protocol might be construed as
stating what the contracting parties always understood –
that no changes to the constitutional structure or the legal
system were intended by the Revised Treaty. The intention
of the 2005 Protocol was to deal with the proposition
(after Independent Jamaica Council for Human Rights (1988)
Ltd. v Marshall-Burnett [2005] 2 AC 356) that a reference
under Article 214 of the Revised Treaty to the Caribbean
Court of Justice would be a reference to a court that did
not enjoy the advantage of entrenchment enshrined in the
Jamaica Constitution in respect of superior courts such as
the Jamaican Court of Appeal.
While it is true that the Privy Council in the Independent
Jamaica Council case was not dealing with the original
jurisdiction of the Caribbean Court of Justice, the real
issue is whether it is permissible to hive off part of the
jurisdiction of a national court to a supposedly
unconstitutional court, whatever jurisdiction it purports to
exercise. That issue can only be resolved by a reversal of
the Independent Jamaica Council case or a finding that a
reference by a national court to the Caribbean Court
pursuant to Article 214 of the Revised Treaty does not
offend the Jamaican Constitution. In any event, the terms
of the local incorporation of Article 214 in the Act
incorporating the Caribbean Court’s original jurisdiction
appears to be misconceived since it purports to give power
to a public official to seek an advisory opinion from the
court, a right reserved only to Member States.
The second difficulty concerning the precedence of
Community law arises where there is a conflict with
national law and constitutional law in particular, in
common law countries. Because of the incorporation of
Community law into the national legal systems, national
law is always in theory subject to amendment or repeal by
a later national law. For that reason, in the United
Kingdom the European Communities Act 1972, which
adopts the principles of the supremacy of Community law,
may in theory be amended or repealed by an Act. Can
Community law override the constitution? One possible
resolution of the problem is to regard the constitution as a
living instrument. On such a reading, a national court may
be inclined to interpret the constitution in the light of
changing economic, social and cultural realities. Among
these realities are the collective aim of Member States for
regional economic integration expressed in the Preamble
to the Revised Treaty and local incorporations of it and the
establishment of a single court, with both a national and a
regional jurisdiction for the purpose of achieving 7
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consistent and uniform interpretation of the Revised Treaty
throughout the region.
On the other hand, I would hazard a guess that the
Caribbean Court might rule in favour of the precedence of
Community law, if only to achieve a result that is uniform
as between civil law and common law systems.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: THE
IMPACT OF NATIONAL LAW
As indicated above, the Revised Treaty is a creature of
international law, Article 217 provides as follows:
“The Court in exercising its original jurisdiction under Article
211 shall apply such rules of international law as may be
applicable.”
In the special leave proceedings in TCL v Caribbean
Community [2009] CCJ 2, the Caribbean Court referred to
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, which is generally regarded as having
authoritatively stated the sources of international law as:
(a) International conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules recognised by the
contracting parties;
(b) International custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law;
(c) General principles of law recognised by civilised
nations;
(d) Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.
Reference should also be made to Aust, A, Handbook of
International Law, Cambridge University Press, p 6.
It is the application of general principles fashioned by
the judges and general principles culled from the national
legal systems of Member States to the “new legal order of
international law” of the regional treaty that creates
Community law as a separate system of law. The general
principles of law invented by the judges are tools of
interpretation and application for the protection of treaty
rights of individuals and entities in the interests of the rule
of law. These universal general principles referred to in the
ICJ statute are in no way different from those applicable
specifically to the Member States of CARICOM or to states
party to regional economic agreements.
Recourse to the general principles of law already
established in recognised regional courts of justice has the
potential to protect and secure treaty rights and
obligations. The protection of these rights and obligations
would advance economic integration by empowering
Community nationals to come before the court to seek
enforcement of commitments and undertakings in the
Revised Treaty.
The experience of the European Court of Justice
indicates that the sources of such general principles of law
are the national legal systems of the Member States, the EC
Treaty or international agreements to which the Member
States subscribe. These general principles of law are used
as a means of assessing the validity of acts of Community
institutions or to control abuse of their powers and to
review the acts of national bodies acting within the sphere
of Community law. General principles of law may also be
used to fill gaps in Community law. Advocate General M
Dutheillet de Lamothe explained that the fundamental
principles of national legal systems … “contribute to forming
that philosophical, political and legal substratum common to the
Member States from which through case law an unwritten
Community law emerges, one of the essential aims of which is
precisely to ensure the respect for the fundamental rights of the
individual.”
General principles of law may be derived also from
international law. The general principle of good faith has
been held by the Court of First Instance of the ECJ (now
Grand Court of the EU) to give rise to legitimate
expectations in Community law: see Opel Austria v Council
[1997] ECR II – 39. Further, the very doctrine of direct
effect is based on an exception to the principle that states
are the proper subjects of international law: see the
Advisory Opinion in the Danzig Railway Officials case (1928)
PCIJ, Ser B No 15 pp 17-18.
The judges of the ECJ filled gaps in the EC Treaty by
having regard to principles of law taken from the Member
States. In Cases 7/56 and 37/57 Algera et al v Assembly
[1957-58] ECR 39, the European Court referred to the
need to fill gaps by recourse to national laws especially
rules applicable in the law of individual Member States on
the issues it had to decide. Professor Hartley summarises
the position as follows:
“When the European Court creates new rules of Community
law, it purports to do so on the basis of ‘general principles of
law.’ In theory, these are principles found in all or most legal
systems. …The principles thus ‘discovered’ by the court are
not always found in a majority or even any of the legal
systems of the Member States. When it wants to create a new
legal rule, the European Court certainly looks at the legal
systems of the Member States. However, it does not regard
itself as bound to adopt the majority view. Once it has
informed itself of possible solutions, it considers itself free to
fashion the rule it regards as most appropriate to the needs of
the Community.’
The Caribbean Court of Justice arrived at broadly
similar conclusions in the special leave application of TCL v
Caribbean Community [2009] CCJ 2(OJ) at [41].
“[41] …This Court may take into account the principles
and concepts common to the laws of Member States. The
search is for general principles of law common to Member
States. It is sufficient if the general principle is widely
accepted: see the opinion of Advocate General Sir Gordon
19168 Amicus 87 Autumn text.qxd:Text  10/11/11  13:41  Page 8
Slynn in AM & S Europe Ltd. v Commission and of the ECJ.
If the general principle is widely accepted throughout the
Community and relevant it may become part of Community
law. These are tests that will have to be applied if this Court
is asked to strike down the decisions authorizing suspension of
the CET on grounds that derive from the domestic law
applicable to judicial review in common law jurisdictions”.
In this way national law might be introduced and made
into a Community blend.
Breach of the judge-made general principles of law may,
in the ECJ, lead to declarations of invalidity upon a
reference, for example because the breach offended the
principle of non-discrimination (Cases 103 and 145/77
Royal Scholten-Honig (Holdings) Ltd v Intervention Board
[1978] ECR 3037); or because of a breach of the principle
of legitimate expectations (Case 120/86 Mulder v Minister
van Landbouw en Visserij [1986] ECR 2321); or because of a
breach of the principle of proportionality (Case 181/84
EDF Mann v Intervention Board [1985] ECR 2889).
In the area of remedies two judge-made principles are
apparent: the principle of effectiveness and the right to
protection of Community rights. In TCL and TCL Guyana
Incorporated v Guyana [2009] CCJ 5 (OJ), the Caribbean
Court accepted the doctrine of state liability for breach of
Community obligations based on these two principles.
The Caribbean Court of Justice has recognized the rule
that general principles of law drawn from national legal
systems or deriving from the provisions of the Revised
Treaty will apply in Community law. It has not used all the
ammunition potentially at its disposal since the
opportunity has not arisen, but a trend has begun.
CONCLUSIONS
(1) Regional courts of justice are essentially creations of
international law. They continue to exist on the
international plane.
(2) Regional courts of justice beget an autonomous legal
order which one might describe as Community law.
Both the European Court of Justice and the Caribbean
Court of Justice have so held.
(3) In Caribbean Community law direct effect Treaty
provisions have been mediated into national laws both
in the civil law and common law systems. In the
common law Member States the Revised Treaty was
incorporated into domestic law; in the civil law
Member States provisions of their constitutions were
complied with to make Community law effective
nationally. In the EU legal system treaties and
subsidiary legislation have direct effect regardless of
whether locally incorporated or not.
(4) Though an unwritten rule, the supremacy of
Community Law over national law in the areas covered
by the Revised Treaty is the logical consequence of
direct effect. However it is not clear whether
“common law” national courts would also hold that
Community law overrides constitutional law although if
one looks at the constitution as a living instrument that
result would follow.
(5) In any event, through the preliminary reference
procedure, national courts in Europe and the
Caribbean may become more involved and participate
in the integration process. The national courts in
Europe have become instruments for the effective
application of Community law and the national courts
of the Caribbean may follow suit.
(6) National law contributes to Community law via “the
general principles of law” based on those established in
the European Union and on the current jurisprudence
of the Caribbean Court.
(7) The economic integration treaties constitute an outline
to be filled in by judge-made law. Judge-made law
constitutes a useful resource for moving forward
economic integration. As Craig and de Burca said of
the ECJ:
“The ECJ has overall pursued a policy of legal integration,
giving substance to an outline Treaty, thereby enhancing the
effectiveness of Community law and promoting its integration
into national legal systems …”
(8) What emerges is an amalgam of three separate systems
fused into one Community law but governed by the
rule of law dispensed by the court.
Kirkham reminds us that:
“… for many writers it was not the Commission that was the
real driving force behind the EEC in its formative years but
the Court of Justice of the European Community.”
It is hoped that the Caribbean Court of Justice would
achieve similar success in building and strengthening
Caribbean economic integration.
The Hon Mr Justice Rolston F Nelson
Caribbean Court of Justice; former IALS Inns of Court Fellow
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